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Abstract: Suppose that the case has been made that evaluations of the artistic
merit of an object or an event should include matters that are outside the scope of
the purely formal. Accounts of why contextual matters should be relevant to art
evaluation have been offered, and I would like to explore what comes next, that is,
how contextual matters should be considered when it comes to the evaluation of
art objects and events.
I.
Suppose that the case has been made that evaluations of the artistic merit
of an object or an event should include matters that are outside the scope
of the purely formal. ‘Outside the scope of the purely formal’ I would call
‘contextual’. Accounts of why contextual matters should be relevant to art
evaluation have been offered, and I would like to explore what comes next,
that is, how contextual matters should be considered when it comes to the
evaluation of art objects and events.1
First, what is a purely formal approach to evaluating works of art? Such an
approach is to limit consideration of relevant matters exclusively to properties
that exist as or through the object’s properties alone, without (straightfor-
ward) reference or relation to anything outside the object. In other words,
to the object’s aesthetic properties. (Such approaches regularly incorporate
consideration of representative features of works and the literary features of
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literary works.) An object’s formal aesthetic properties have been described
widely as arising from or through that object’s properties that are, without
mediation, accessible to an observer’s senses. An object may possess the aes-
thetic properties of elegance, balance, harmony, grace, and so forth, and it
possesses such properties because of the presence and configuration of line,
texture, color, tone, symmetry, and other such ‘basic’ properties that are,
through human senses, known to be present in the object. This is to say
that formal aesthetic properties do not admit of any subjective matters – any
matters that have their being in the subject, the audience member – except
in the most rudimentary sense that metaphysically it likely requires a subject
for the existence of aesthetic properties as they are seen, through the exercise
of the human faculty of taste, to actually exist.2 And it is also to say that
an object’s formal aesthetic properties do not include any matters that have
their being beyond the object (as the object is known immediately through
human senses).3
Second, what does it mean to evaluate an art object, taking into account
relevant contextual matters? It is first to recognise that works of art bear
many relations to other works of art and they bear many relations to the
subjects – the audience members, the ‘attenders’ – who view, hear, or oth-
erwise experience them. These relationships point to facts either about the
object itself or the experience of it that at many times when an evaluation
is being performed seem relevant to that evaluation. That is, a contextual
matter may raise or lower the value of the object or the experience of the
object. If the case is made that such matters should be included in an overall
assessment of the work of the object, then the question is: how should this
be done? And this is precisely what this paper is about.
II. WHAT IS BEING EVALUATED?
Is the evaluation being done of the work of art itself or of a subject’s experience
of the work? The answer to this question depends largely on the theory of
artistic value, or perhaps aesthetic value (as would more likely be the case in
formalist approaches), that is being employed. Different value theories will
focus in different ways in terms of identifying the locus of the value. Let’s
briefly consider the two obvious alternatives.
Is the value in question located in the object itself? The formalist is more
likely to prefer this approach, given that she means to focus for evaluative
purposes on those properties that are possessed by the object in a straightfor-
ward way. And others may prefer this approach as well, given that it would
seem the greatest evaluative stability is found by focusing on the most stable
part of the equation, the object itself. Works of art, for the most part, do
not change a great deal. Some may change a bit as time wears them down
or the original mechanisms for producing allographic works are worn down.
Some may change because their means of reproduction are inherently vul-
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nerable to change. This is certainly the case with dance. Two dances that
bear the same name may be different from one another, even when they have
choreographers who were taught by the same teacher, because their memo-
ries of what they were taught differ slightly, because they are working with
different companies of dancers with different styles of training, because the
stages for the two dance performances are different sizes and accommodation
must be made, and so forth. Some works of art, particularly modern ones,
may change as their components naturally decay. Chris Ofili’s famous (or
infamous) Madonna with a breast fashioned from elephant dung is a case in
point. Or Damien Hirst’s bifurcated animals. But these cases are largely
either outliers or we are comfortable that their particular forms unavoidably
admit of change. In the main, works of art are static, and so it may be as-
sumed that if we focus on the object itself, evaluations of that object will
enjoy the same stability. And of course the gold standard (brass ring?) for
evaluation is stability and universality across all particular evaluations.
In art evaluation where the focus is exclusively on the object’s formal
properties, relations that the object may bear to other objects or to subjects
are not relevant. Again, we must be careful to say that the very existence of
aesthetic properties, as we described above, may of necessity involve reference
to subjects, but the relationship in question here is not one that impacts the
value of the object. One may claim that what aesthetic properties arise
through the attendance of the subject to the object is certainly a matter of
value: the subject chooses which ‘basic’ properties on which to focus, and
the resulting value of the object can be radically different, one subjective
focus to another. But those who make such an objection, however correct
it is possible they may be, seem to be cheating the formalist of her prize.
Oscar Wilde wished to escape the intrusion of the subject imposing anything
about her own perspective on the value of the object. To then say that
all acts of bringing into existence aesthetic properties are necessarily value-
laden is to rob Wilde of his goal: the potential of a pure art evaluation of
an object. We can perhaps protect a Wildean approach by eliminating the
vagaries of particular subjective assessments of the set of aesthetic properties
possessed by an object by invoking a Humean conception of an ideal attender,
one who possesses the appropriate virtues such that any two of these ideal
attenders would render very similar if not identical sets of an object’s aesthetic
properties. Whether such an approach would ultimately pan out in practice
– or even hold up to theoretical scrutiny – is a matter of debate, but if we are
willing to grant Wilde the possibility of his prize, then an approach sufficiently
like this one must be on offer.
The challenge to objectivist approaches comes when, in seeking for what
accounts for this evaluative stability, we construct nomological devices or
formulas, ones that hold that if properties x, y, or z are present in a particular
work, that work possess the appropriate features to be rightly judged to be
artistically or aesthetically meritorious. This approach, and the seeds of its
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apparent failure, are evident right through from ancient Greek to medieval
Europe, and it had its heyday in the 17th and 18th centuries.4 Objective
formulas were attempted time and again – and for good reason: they should
have been implied by the original commitment to understanding the locus of
value to be the object and its properties.
By the advent of Hume and Kant, the focus on the objective was giving
way to a focus on the subjective, and it is here where the theories of artis-
tic/aesthetic value of the 20th and 21st centuries have their roots. Once that
focus changes, it changes for good. While there may still be theories that
hold that the value of works of art are intrinsic or even inherent in the object
itself, these are not commonplace. The switch to the subject and the subject’s
experience are the norm today.
Today there are aesthetic evaluation theories that focus on the subject’s
experience, and these theories cash out value in terms that focus on one sort
or another of movement occasioned in the subject – movement in cognition,
in emotion, in psychology, in a feeling of escape of some sort, or simply a
movement toward felt pleasure (though perhaps that is captured under ‘emo-
tion’).5 These are worthy theories since objects whose aesthetic characters
are unactualised by human attention are comparable to trees falling in empty
forests.
It is possible one might argue in a way very different from the objectivist
approach sketched above that when it comes to a thoroughly contextualist
approach to art evaluation, still there is no need to bother with exploring
a relationship between the object and the subject since our focus may be
thought to be exclusively on the experience of the audience member, and, as
such, be exclusively about the subject herself. The object, in this scenario,
would occupy a position similar to that of the subject in the sketch from above:
it may be necessary to a thorough description of the situation, but it plays
no role that impacts the value of the experience. Surely there are those who
believe that every experience is so deeply embedded in a subjective situated-
ness that no two may ever be claimed to be similar enough to constitute
comparability. There is, in this case, no object that is relevant, as each focus
of an experience is practically radically different from every other focus. To
attach it to something external to the subject’s perception is a conceit. And
while we may be tempted by such a conceit, because we as audience members
love to be able to compare our experiences with those of others and with our
own experiences over time, we should avoid falling prey to such a temptation
because it crowds the playing field with more items than are metaphysically
necessary. The felt experience is enough, and so no matters of relation need
to be addressed. So such a claim might say.
Contextual matters, broadly conceived, certainly include elements that
index very narrowly to a particular subject at a particular place and time.
These sorts of contextual elements must be considered legitimate as pieces
of the evaluative puzzle when the value we are focused on is located in the
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subject’s experience. My experience of an aesthetic object as a matter of
straightforward fact will include a very wide range of elements that are not
available to anyone but me, are integral to my experience, and, vis a vis
their being part of my individual experience, are incorrigible as I cite them
as evidence in my case for the worth of that experience. If we have as our
evaluative focus a particular experience, not only will the list of items that
rightly may be included in an evaluation be potentially enormous, it may not
be transferrable from one subject to another in any satisfying way – that is,
in any way that involves substantive enough comparison. And if it is not
transferrable, one subject to another, it is likely not going to perform any
real work when it comes to building an interesting evaluative case. Without
meaningful comparison, without meaningful applications over a set with a
membership greater than one, what is the point?
To argue either the merits of the Wildean approach or this hyper-phenom-
enalised approach is beyond this paper. To argue for one theory of artistic or
aesthetic value over another is beyond this paper. What we can, nevertheless,
take away from this brief overview is the following. First, if we have conceded
that contextual matters may be relevant to the evaluation of a work of art, and
we acknowledge that contextual matters almost certainly refer to relationships
between the object under evaluation and facts external to that object, we
are likely going to find ourselves rejecting purely objectivist accounts of the
location of artistic value. Second, if we have then conceded that artistic value
necessarily has to do with subjective appreciation of the object, and so to some
important degree the value lies in the subject’s experience of the object, then
we have to do the work of figuring out just exactly which experiential matters
are relevant and which ones are not.
III. TO WHOM ARE THE RELEVANT CONTEXTUAL
PROPERTIES RELEVANT?
We might hope that the answer to this question is ‘everyone’. But that gets
very tricky. Let us begin by sketching out a continuum going from those
properties that are relevant to everyone and those that are relevant only to
the single particular subject. At one end of the spectrum are matters that
are available to any subject who has but a little knowledge about the object;
in the case of art, we could include genetic matters about the origin of the
work, its provenance, the history of its exhibition, and perhaps how it has
been regarded during its time (for instance, the Mona Lisa may be special in
part simply because of how it has been regarded over its lifespan). At the far
other end of the spectrum are matters that are indexed to a particular subject
at a particular time and place; these matters could include how much time
the subject has for attending to the object, whether the subject is distracted,
and whether the subject is in a good mood.6
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It is too easy to say that what may be relevant to everyone are ‘facts’,
because while ‘facts’ will include items that are widely publicly accessible like
genetic and provenantial information, it is a matter of ‘fact’ that while, at
a given place and at a given time, I watch Casablanca, I may work out how
I think and feel about identifying with Rick; I may consider the irony that
while the film is abundantly anti-fascist there are in the world today elements
of fascism rising again; I may wrestle with how moving the scenes are that
focus on the singing of the Marseillaise while at the same time realising that
some of the words of the song are nationalist, even nativist, in at least an
uncomfortable way; I may enjoy the nostalgia of remembering when I first
saw the film and under what conditions; I might even think about whether
I want to use the film as my example of ‘Classic Hollywood’ the next time I
teach a course in the aesthetics of film. These are all factual matters; they
are facts about my particular experience. But of course they are largely if
not exclusively only available to me as an individual.
On the other end of the spectrum, if we say that to be considered relevant
a fact must be accessible to everyone, we run a different risk. Not every
attender to a particular work of art will be as educated about that work as
every other. This is almost sure to be the case. We may privilege the educated
viewer and hold the position that when it comes to seeking the most stable
approach to evaluating a work of art we will appeal to an idealised version
of the educated viewer, one who, perhaps following Hume here, knows as
much about the object and its relations as the most informed critic might be
expected to.
This strikes me as impractical if not elitist. Not only may we have moral
qualms about privileging such a perspective, not only may we have epistemic
or otherwise theoretic hesitations about relegating true evaluations to ideals
and not to actual folks having actual experiences, we may have lost sight of
our original golden goal of capturing the universality we might wish in artistic
evaluation. This last criticism is one that may be levelled at Kant and likely
Hume as well. ‘Universal’ becomes something available, at best, only to a
small set of properly situated and properly mindful attenders, and perhaps –
in the worst case of where the evaluative mechanisms are too idealised – to
none at all.
Granted this is a worst case scenario. Our goal may be more modest in
terms of the breadth of commonality about such judgements, and we may
believe that if everyone literally means ‘everyone’, practicality, and so use-
fulness, goes out the window. But it should be clear that the two ends of
the continuum are likely not going to provide us with what we seek: a cir-
cumscription of exactly which contextual matters should be relevant when
making art evaluations.
If either end of the continuum is not looking promising – the one end far
too liberal in terms of accepting every feature of every attender’s experience,
the other being far to conservative in limiting what is relevant only to what is
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accessible to, at best, the very few – we need to look at the middle. If we take
‘the middle’ too literally, though, we have another problem, the problem of
populism. Taking a survey of the majority of attenders to a particular work,
asking each if they found their experience valuable and then amalgamating
the results, is not the right path. This path is simply an aggregation of the
‘too liberal’ approach, and it has all those same pitfalls. Perhaps then we
need to think about ‘the middle’ a bit more theoretically. If we removed
the stylised idealisation from our construction of the ‘well educated’ viewer,
retaining ‘well educated’ but cashing that in practical terms, terms that cash
out the access to this education as being widely available to attenders with
access to museum guides or playbills or performance notes, to the small (or
sometimes large) plaques that are in proximity to works hanging in museums
or galleries, to popular venues of criticism from respectable YouTube-style
videos to quality blogs to the New Yorker – nothing in this list can be taken as
either necessary or sufficient, of course – we might end up with a ‘middle’ that
is recognisable, practical, and, more importantly, satisfying to our intuitions
(‘our’ being those of the full range of members of the Artworld, however
central or distant from Arthur Danto’s core that membership may be).
IV. WHEN IS THE EVALUATION MADE?
If contextual matters are relevant to the evaluation of a work of art, then
given that contextual matters can and do change over time, the question of
‘when’ the evaluation is made seems an important one.
Many have had the experience of waiting to purchase a new piece of tech-
nology until we believe the advance of the technology has stabilised and will
not be replaced by something entirely new in short order. We wait until it
looks as though Blu-ray will not be replaced before buying films; we wait until
CDs look permanent before replacing our vinyl collection; we wait until the
safety features available on our new cars have reached an apparent plateau
before purchase. And most have had the experience where at some point one
just makes the purchase, not knowing whether stability has been achieved;
we launch out in faith that our purchases will not meet regret. But we really
do not know. The same is the case with art evaluations. If we follow some
version of the Test of Time as a sign of the value of a work of art, it is near
impossible to know exactly that the appropriate point in time is reached so
that the evaluation we make has some chance of stability. Inflated valuations
happen early, as does the situation where great works go unnoticed; fads tend
to be identifiable as do financial art market fluctuations. But, barring these,
to know precisely when a stable judgement should be made is not easy.
Works of art change in value.7 Once one leaves a strictly formalist or
objectivist take on evaluation, this seems a brute fact. And many of these
changes are occasioned by contextual matters. When a work is ‘discovered’,
this changes its value. When an artist dies, this sometimes changes the value
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of works by that artist. When the political context in which the work was
created changes, a work’s value may change. Given that these changes are
not (normally) under the control of the evaluator, it would seem the best rule
to follow is simply this: once one takes account of common and recognisable
vagaries connected to the value of work of art, the evaluator is free to make an
evaluation. This evaluation is not a once-and-for-all judgement; it is instead
indexed to a particular time, and as time passes, evaluations should be made
again and again.
There is nothing lost in such an approach except for those who believe
that the value of objects is a permanent and immutable condition. If one
believes, instead, that changes in value are natural and expected, then when
an evaluation is made should not cause us worry.
V. WHICH PROPERTIES?
Despite the adoption of an evaluative approach that significantly incorpo-
rates the subject and her experience, and despite the (apparent) fact that the
value of art objects are not entirely stable over the span of their existences,
still we should seek as much stability in our judgements as we can achieve.
This is for the reason that comparisons – comparisons among viewers, com-
parisons over successive encounters with the object, comparisons among art
objects themselves – are only interesting if there is something worthy about
the judgement.
We might therefore begin a list of those contextual properties that are
relevant to an evaluation with those items that are connected to the object
itself. The object was created at a certain time and place, and by a certain
person or set of persons. In the case of autographic works, the object was
possessed by certain persons or institutions. The object was exhibited, per-
formed or otherwise made available to certain audiences in certain venues.
These factual matters adhere to the object itself, and so to the degree to
which the object is stable – and again, that may be a sliding scale – these
matters will be stable.
Certainly we would include in the list of relevant contextual matters the
representative features of works that are representative (or widely taken to
be). We would include the relationships the object bears to others created
by the same artist, by the same school of art, in the same style, at the same
time, in the same location, and so forth. For literature, we would of course
include the semantic content of the object; for architecture, furniture, and so
forth, the function or functionality of the object; for works that are purported
by their creators as being didactic or message driven, the ideas meant to be
conveyed.
Should the list stop there? Likely not. The educated viewer described
above tends to know more than these object-focused facts. Our educated
viewer likely knows the sort of facts that populate art critical reviews, facts
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about how the work generally has been received by audiences, how audiences
have found meaning in the work or how the work has been commonly inter-
preted, and matters concerning how the artist regarded the work, if the artist
chose to make those matters public.
In addition, we might add one more category. If there are contextual
matters about the work that are grounded in the formal features of the object,
then they too should be counted as relevant to evaluations given that they
may be the most accessible to audiences of all properties. For instance, if
a painting employs a pointillist style, we may wish to compare it to other
pointillist works. If a musical composition includes discordant elements or
counterpoint elements, we may wish to compare those works with works that
include similar elements.
And so, on what types of matters might we wish to focus? A non-
exhaustive list might include the following when it comes to works of art:
• Matters pertaining to the artist
• Matters pertaining to the conditions of the origin of the work
• Matters pertaining to the existence of the work through time
• Matters pertaining to provenance of the work
• Matters pertaining to the exhibition (performance, etc.) of the work
• Matters pertaining to the representative features of the work
• Matters pertaining to the style of the work
• Matters pertaining to the ‘fame’ of the work; how the work has been,
in the main, received by audiences and the scale of those audiences and
those receptions
• Matters pertaining to artist intentions
• Matters pertaining to the history of the critical review of the work
• Matters pertaining to large-scale trends of audience identification with
aspects of the work: does the work, according to those who talk about
it, teach audience members a lesson; does it have a pronounced didac-
tic impact? Does it speak to the ethical, religious or political climate
surrounding it? Does it speak to the experience of those who are from
a particular race, ethnicity, gender, sexual identification? Does it speak
to the experience of those from a particular geographical area or a par-
ticular socio-economic status? Does it speak to those in particular re-
lationships with other humans, with other animals, with other material
objects, with particular bounded lifespans?
• Matters pertaining to the large-scale trends of audience cognitive en-
gagement, emotional engagement, psychological engagement with the
work; does the work speak to particular abstractions that typically en-
gage audience consideration?
VI. HOW SHOULD THEY BE INCORPORATED?
We come full circle to the question on which this paper is based: how should
contextual matters figure into art evaluations?
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The premises with which we are working are the following:
• We take it as a premise that the case for inclusion of relevant contextual
matters in the evaluation of work of art is made (although not here).
• To the extent possible the focus is on the object itself, but no exclusively
objective approach will be satisfying today; evaluations must include
reference to the audience member and her experience of the work.
• In complement, no approach that focuses exclusively on a particular
subject’s particular experience will be satisfying; neither will be an ap-
proach that simply aggregates such things.
• The object’s relationships to other objects and to subjects are evalua-
tively important.
• The value of works of art change over time, but despite this enough
stability is achievable in evaluations to make them interesting for the
purposes of comparison.
• And, finally, although no mention of this has been made so far, the inclu-
sion of contextual matters in art evaluations should fit most, perhaps
the vast majority, of theories that explain artistic (and/or aesthetic)
value – that is, apart from the purely objectivist sort. The one view
mentioned in this paper is a ‘soft’ version of the Humean Test of Time,
something along the lines that works of art that sustain repeated at-
tention by a wide variety of audiences, that continue to reward this
attention over repeated encounters, and that do so over time, are works
that bear the symptom of possessing artistic value (and/or aesthetic
value, the two being fairly similar before the 20th century, somewhat
distinct after).8
Given this, I would propose that the way that relevant contextual matters
should be included in evaluations of works of art is that each matter should
weigh in the evaluation to the degree of its experiential impact across a large
range of appropriately suited real-life attenders. If a relevant contextual mat-
ter makes a noteworthy impact on the experiences of educated viewers, across
the spectrum discussed in this paper, those matters should be included in the
evaluation. The degree to which a particular matter should influence the
evaluation should be in direct proportion of the experiential impact across
the spectrum of educated viewers. If a relevant contextual matter makes no
broad experiential difference, it should be ignored in the evaluation. If it
makes some small difference, it should be included but only to that same
small degree. If it makes a major difference, then it should be included in a
significantly focal way.
Educated viewers know something about the importance to the American
art scene of Jackson Pollock and his drip paintings. In the early twentieth
century, critics like Clement Greenberg focused on the formalist aspects of
works of art – in this case painting – recommending painterly approaches that
incorporated greater focus on the medium itself. Abstract expressionism –
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particularly American but perhaps more widely – gave up representational
features for ones that focused more obviously and directly on the paint (and
color, line, texture, etc.) itself. Pollock was working in exactly this vein,
with his drip paintings becoming less and less representational and more and
more ‘flat’ in terms of the spatial depth suggested by the paint on the canvas.
My respect for Pollock is borne almost entirely on this sort of story; I have
very little appreciation for the aesthetic qualities of his work, but I still am
keen to visit Number 1, aka Lavender Mist, and spend some time with it each
time I am in Washington D.C. My time spent with it is not in appreciation
of its aesthetic qualities but rather out of respect for its importance as a step
along the way in the evolution of American art. The context of this work
accounts for its artistic value to a large degree; this is the case for me – I
count myself an educated viewer – but also for many. Not, I am quick to add,
for all. Lavender Mist is one of the more aesthetically attractive of the drip
paintings, I believe, and I am certain there are many who would judge the
value of the work to lie in its formal beauty. The extent to which the art-
historical situated-ness of Lavender Mist accounts for its value is a matter
of assessing whether, through time and over a range of similarly prepared
viewers, the consensus is more toward my view or more toward a traditional
aesthetic view. This is not a matter of taking a poll; it is rather a matter
of watching the trends in critical discussions of the work, in how the work is
described in art history and philosophical aesthetics courses, in what curators
choose to say about it in guides and on plaques, and perhaps even how folks
at cocktail parties talk about it. To know the impact of the contextual story,
we need to identify the trajectory of the conversation with a hope of finding
a general consensus about the core of the narrative today.
In this same arena, I imagine the story is a bit different with the work of
Mark Rothko and his large colour-field paintings. There are similar formal
elements in both the work of Pollock and of Rothko, and this is so to a
high degree. And the educated viewer may know something about Rothko’s
work – that he did not want it overlit, that he wanted viewers to come upon
it and appreciate a work’s typically large size somewhat abruptly, that he
believed the works were expressions of abstract emotional states, things like
this. But my guess is that the bulk of viewers of many of Rothko’s works
appreciate those works aesthetically – by which I mean here formally – rather
than in light of their contexts. The Seagram Collection at the Tate Modern is
displayed as Rothko might have liked, but what is noteworthy for my purposes
is that at the center of the somewhat enclosed and compact room in which
the large primarily black and maroon canvases are hung are benches. My
recollection is that there are several. This suggests to me that Tate Modern
patrons are spending time looking at the canvases, perhaps significant time.
Works of art whose highest value is found in appreciating them cognitively
do not need benches. Which is to say, the benches are there to facilitate
time spent by the viewer in appreciation of the perceptual qualities of the
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work; cognitive appreciation does not necessarily require an investment of
time spent looking but rather thinking, and thinking is not something that
must be done in the presence of the work. J.M.W. Turner’s The Fighting
Temeraire, voted in 2005 as Britain’s favourite painting and hanging for a
great number of years in London’s National Gallery across town from the Tate
Modern, has before it large red leather sofas, ones I know from experience are
comfortable enough to spend a great deal of time in contemplation of – for
me – the traditional aesthetic features of the painting. My guess is that the
same is the case for the Rothko Seagram Collection. If I am right that this
is the general trajectory of how paintings in this collection are appreciated,
then the contextual matters I mentioned directly above should not feature
strongly in accounts of the value of these works.
I focus on these two painters because their work is generally well known,
relatively recent, easily accessible, the focus of a lot of conversation, and have
fairly well known contextual aspects among those who consider themselves
followers of art, particularly modern art. We have a good chance of getting
right, for now, an evaluation of the value of Lavender Mist and one of the
Black-and-Maroon Rothko canvases in light of the degree to which contextual
aspects of these works play a role in the experiences of those who spent time
with them.
‘A relevant contextual matter should be included in an evaluation of a
work of art to the degree of its experiential impact across a large range of
educated viewers’ should be the case regardless of whether the inclusion of
the matter in the evaluation enhances or diminishes the value of the work.
As some formal features of works increase the value of those works, and as
some decrease the value, so it should be the same with contextual matters.
Evaluations are only proper when they are made on a level playing field, when
they are not prejudiced in any way, when they incorporate the full range of
available data. In this they are like explanations, theories, or other epistemic
justificatory cases. And actually they are not ‘like’ epistemic justificatory
cases, they are such cases. Crafting a case for the value of a work of art is
an exercise in critical thinking as much as crafting a case for any belief or
claim is. So long as the crafting is principled, then the claim will enjoy the
degree of support the case offers. What this paper purports to do is offer
a principled means of crafting cases for artistic judgements concerning the
inclusion of contextual matters.
dfenner@unf.edu
NOTES
1See David Fenner 2008. Whether
cases made for the inclusion of contextual
matters in either understanding art expe-
rience or in evaluating art are ultimately
successful, the ‘how’ question may still be
of interest. Occasionally answers to ‘how’
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questions cast interesting light back on the
‘what’ questions by revealing practical im-
plications of adopting the view or claim on
offer.
2Following, of course, Sibley 1959.
3This account is meant to follow the
work of Nick Zangwill: 1999, 2000a, and
2000b. Formalism has a strong intuitive
appeal; it seeks to set aside the irrelevant
and distracting in its (experiential or eval-
uative) focus on the aesthetic qualities of
the object or event under review, with ‘aes-
thetic’ qualities understood as those that
connect, in etymological fashion, with the
concept of ‘aesthetics’, traditionally un-
derstood to be one’s un-mediated sensory
uptake of an experience. Prior to Picasso
and Duchamp, there was little reason to
question this approach; unfortunately now
such an approach has largely been aban-
doned – except of course for the exceptions
like Nick Zangwill.
4Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas
Aquinas all offered such formulas, but per-
haps some of the strongest approaches
were offered by Joseph Addison 1957,
Archibald Alison 1968, Lord Shaftesbury
1964, and Francis Hutcheson 1971. The
creation of objective formulas are the nat-
ural result of adopting the approach that
there are properties or configurations of
properties that give rise in lawlike ways
to the presence of such evaluatively sum-
mative properties as beauty and aesthetic
merit. Once one adopts such an objec-
tive approach to evaluation, the implica-
tion is that some formula can be discov-
ered. As counterexamples to formulas are
discovered or invented anew by artists, the
promise of such an objectivist approach
fades.
5See Alan Goldman 1995. On pages
150 and 151, Goldman writes: ‘The value
of such works lies first in the challenge and
richness of the perceptual, affective, and
cognitive experience they afford. Symbolic
and expressive density combines here with
sensuous feel. From the subjective side, all
one’s perceptual, cognitive, and affective
capacities can be engaged in apprehending
these relations, even if one’s grasp of them
is imperfect or only implicit. These differ-
ent facets of appreciation are not only en-
gaged simultaneously but are also often in-
dissolubly united, as when formal relations
among musical tones or painted shapes are
experienced as felt tensions and resolutions
and perhaps as higher-order or more ordi-
nary emotions as well. . .When we are so
fully and satisfyingly involved in appreci-
ating an artwork, we can be said to lose
our ordinary, practically oriented selves in
a world of the work. . . . [It] can engage us
so fully as to constitute another world for
us, at least temporarily’.
6See David Fenner 2003
7See Anita Silvers 1991.
8See Peter Kivy 1986, for an examina-
tion of the relationship between the ‘test of
time’ and the ideal critic/educated viewer.
Kivy suggests that the test of time implies
an appeal to authority and that author-
ity need not be drawn out over time but
rather captured in a subject who possesses
the appropriate abilities to judge well. In
other words, there’s no reason to wait for
the test of time to do the work it holds
promise to if we can appeal to an ideally
situated and skilled critic now. The prac-
ticalities of such an approach are what mo-
tivates me to construct the particulars of
my view of the ‘educated viewer’.
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